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From the Caymans 
Students, teachers and textbook writers now 
have another international acronym to worry 
about-IBF. (It means International Banking 
Facility.) Like SDR (Special Drawing Rights), 
BIS (Bank for International Settlement), FAS8 
(Financial Accounting Standard #8) and 
CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments 
System), IBF is one of those acronyms which 
international finance specialists deal with 
every day, but which the man-in-the-street 
fi nds fraught with mystery. 
Actually, IBFs represent an important inno-
vation in international banking. If imple-
mented, they could have a significant impact 
on the conduct of international banking in the 
United States and abroad. Indeed, some ob-
servers worry that IBFs could have adverse 
effects on the conduct of u.s. domestic mon-
etary and banking pol icy. 
Background 
Two months ago, the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors submitted a proposal for public 
comment, which would permit U.S. banking 
institutions to establish International Banking 
Facilities within the nation's borders for the 
conduct of  international banking activities, 
i.e., lending to and borrowing from non-U.S. 
residents. Many U.S. banks actually have 
been engaged in such activities since the 
1960s. However, they have operated either 
through full-service branches in foreign fi-
nancial centers (such as London, Frankfurt, 
Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Singapore) or 
through so-called "shell branches." The latter 
are I  itfle more than name plates at offshore 
islands (such as the Bahamas and Cayman 
Islands), with business conducted in the u.s. 
but assigned to "shell branch" books main-
tained at head offices. 
With IBFs, activities of this type would be 
brought back to U.S. soil. Like a "shell 
branch," an IBF would not be a full-service 
branch; it would need no separate office 
space, polished marble columns, carpeted 
floors, attentive tellers, nor other parapher-
nal ia usually associated with banking offices. 
Indeed, it could be just a set of accounts 
segregated on the books of a depository insti-
tution for specifically designated categories 
of customers and types of  transactions. 
The idea originated with the New York Clear-
ing House Association, which in 1978 pro-
posed the establishment of IBFs with (a) 
exemption of IBF income from New York 
State taxes, and (b) exemption of IBF deposits 
from Federal Reserve reserve requirements 
and interest-rate limitations. In June 1978, the 
state legislature passed legislation incorpor-
ating the Clearing House proposal, and the 
Clearing House subsequently asked the Fed-
eral Reserve to make the necessary regulatory 
changes. In December 1980, the Board of 
Governors approved a proposal to amend 
Federal Reserve regulations for the estab-
lishment of IBFs, and invited public com-
ments prior to final promulgation. 
Proposal provisions 
Under the proposal, IBFs could be estab-
lished by all U.S. depository institutions (in-
cluding banks and thrift institutions), Edge 
Corporations (U.s.-chartered corporations 
authorized to engage in international bank-
ing operations), and U.S. branches and agen-
cies offoreign banks. These IBFs could accept 
time deposits and borrow funds from foreign 
residents or other IBFs, free of Federal Re-
serve reserve requirements and interest-rate 
limitations. They could then use the funds for 
extending credit to foreign residents, other 
IBFs, or to the U.S. offices of IBF parent 
institutions. 
With IBFs, banking offices in the U.S. could 
compete with banks abroad on an equal foot-
ing in the international market, which doesn't 
involve the reserve requirements and interest 
rate limitations found in the domestic mar-
ket. Thus, IBFs would be able to offer non-
resident customers better terms than are 
) W(~cdl~rr~@\n ~~~~1fW~ 
IP1 ~\rf~  Ik\  cD) II 
~~\  ~~\ fi\\  ~  'l;H '5\ y'\\ (ev n° r~  ((\1 (('»  ~(Q.~JlL1  .u ~  .!J.  (9_.7~J.o~"""  ~\.,.~"'\,..-' 
Ooinions expressed in this newsletter do not 
n~cessarily j:eflect the views of the management 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of San  Francisco, 
nor of the Board of Covernors of the Federa! 
Reserve Systern. 
available to domestic customers, on both 
deposits and loans. But to preserve the in-
tegrity of domestic banking regulations, IBFs 
would have to be insulated from the domestic 
banking market as a means of forestalling 
"leakages." 
To this end, IBFs would be permitted to ac-
cept only non-negotiable time deposits from 
non-U.S. residents (including foreign affili-
ates of U.S. corporations), other IBFs and IBF 
parent institutions. These deposits would be 
subject to a two-day minimum maturity or 
required notice period prior to withdrawal. In 
addition, the minimum size of deposits or 
withdrawals would be set at $500,000 to 
keep IBF deposits from being used for trans-
action purposes. (Under an alternative pro-
posal, the minimum average daily balance 
would be set at $500,000 and the minimum 
size of transaction at $100,000.) Besides of-
fering time deposits, IBFs could borrow from 
the interbank market outside this country, 
from other IBFs inside the country, and also 
from parent institutions. All such borrowings 
would be exempt from Federal Reserve re-
serve requirements. 
On the asset side, IBFs would be permitted to 
extend credit to non-U.S. residents, in the 
form of loans or investments, for financing 
operations outside the United States. For in-
stance, a foreign subsidiary of a u.s. corpor-
ation could borrow only if  the loan proceeds 
were used to finance the borrower's foreign 
operations. Advances to u.s. offices of  parent 
institutions would be subject to the same 
reserve requirements as those currently 
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imposed on the offices' Eurocurrency 
borrowings. 
Up to now, only New York State has adopted 
legislation exempting IBF income from state 
income taxes. To permit time for other states 
to adoptsimilar legislation, the Federal Re-
serve has proposed delaying implementation 
of the arrangement until October 1 of this 
year. 
Major issues 
Public benefits. IBF proponents argue that 
such facilities, by expanding international-
banking activities in this country, would lead 
to increased employment, higher Federal tax 
revenues, and greater efficiency of U.S. 
banks. The magnitude of  these benefits 
would depend upon how much business ac-
tually shifted from overseas to this country. In 
June 1980, claims of U.S. banks' foreign 
branches on non-U.s. residents amounted to 
$221  billion, with Caribbean shell branches 
accounting for $94 billion of the total. Be-
cause of  the many locational factors in-
volved, it would be difficult to estimate pre-
cisely how much of  this business IBFs would 
attract to the United States-or to gauge the 
employment and tax-revenue effects of such 
shifts. But IBF proponents see another advan-
tage: the measure might induce U.S. branch-
es and agencies of foreign banks to retain 
their international-banking operations in this 
country. Under the International Banking Act 
of 1978 and the Monetary Control Act of 
1980, these branches and agencies are sub-
ject to the same reserve requirements as U.s. 
banks. Thus, without IBFs, U.S  .. branches and 
agencies of foreign banks might be tempted 
to shift their international-banking operations 
away from their u.s. offices. 
Competitive impact. To date, no other state 
outside New York has passed legislation to 
exempt IBFs from state income taxes. As 
noted above, the Federal Reserve has pro-
posed postponing the IBF startup until Oc-
tober, to allow time for other states to pass 
similar legislation. But New York has other 
factors besides tax considerations in its favor. For example, it is a focal point for the clearing 
and settlement of international payments, 
conducted through the Clearing House of 
Interbank Payments Systems (CHIPS). Mem-
bership in CHIPS is limited to banks located 
in New York, including Edge Corporations of 
regional banks. Banks outside New York gen-
era"y incur higher costs because of  their need 
to clear and settle international payments and 
receipts through either thei r Edge Corpora-
tions or their New York correspondents. 
Moreover, Edge Corporations don't  enjoy as 
much international prestige as their parent 
banks, because of  their limited separate cap-
italization. Hence, the establishment of IBFs 
could increase New York's advantage in in-
ternational banking relative to the rest of the 
country. 
Monetary-policy impact 
Although the Federal Reserve hopes to insu-
late IBFs from the domestic banking business, 
non-resident deposits currently in U.s. banks 
nonetheless would be free to shift to IBFs. In 
June 1980, non-resident demand deposits 
(inclu9ing those of  foreign banks and official 
institutions) amounted to nearly $21  billion, 
and non-resident time deposits to about $30 
billion. Given the proposed restrictions on 
time deposits, non-residents are not likely to 
shift much of  the demand deposits used for 
transactions purposes to IBFs, but they cer-
tainly would have an incentive to shift time 
deposits. A one-time shift of  this type would 
cause little problem for u.S. monetary policy, 
as the resultant reduction in required reserves 
could be offset by Federal Reserve open-
market operations. Nor would it cause much 
difficulty for domestic credit availability, 
because funds shifted to IBFs could be easily 
redirected back to the u.s. market through 
the Eurodo"ar market. Such interbank fund 
flows are routine and do occur in very large 
volumes. 
Some critics are concerned that the planned 
separation of IBFs from domestic banking 
could not be watertight. They argue that U.S. 
residents, faced with higher interest rates on 
IBF deposits than on domestic deposits, 
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would have an incentive to shift funds into 
IBFs-for instance, through real or bogus 
foreign subsidiaries or affiliates. In their view, 
large shifts of  this sort would tend to subvert 
u.s. bank reserve requirements; moreover, 
any shifts from reservable accounts to non-
reservable accounts would tend to stimulate 
an inflationary monetary expansion. 
Defenders of  the IBF proposal, on the other 
hand, pointoutthat IBFs would compete with 
existing international-banking offices located 
in foreign financial centers, including "she" 
branches," and that U.S. residents already 
possess free access to such facilities. IBFs 
would alter only the location and not the 
accessibility of  such facilities. Hence, the 
monetary-policy impact might be relatively 
small, according to this line of reasoning. 
Prospects 
If serious objections don't arise during the 
public-comment period, IBFs might be in 
operation next October. This development 
would, for the first time, make it possible for 
deposit-taking institutions in this country to 
compete on an equal basis with u.s. and 
foreign banking offices located abroad, inso-
far as reserve requirements and interest-rate 
limitations are concerned. 
No one knows whether the establ ishment of 
IBFs would lead to a massive shift of inter-
national banking business to the United 
States. But there is no question that such a 
development would give further impetus to 
the growth of international banking in this 
country. 
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(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted)-total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.S. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
9,801  7.1 
10,008  8.7 
3,585  10.7 
6,625  15.0 
- 704  - 2.9 
520  54.6 
- 407  - 5.7 
200  1.3 
- 3,339  7.7 
- 3,135  - 9.8 
817  2.9 
17,596  29.8 
16,818  33.5 
8,967  42.1 
Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended  Comparable 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 





1/21/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  10 
321  336 
n.a.  - 346 
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